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LEGISLATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
Richard L. Ottingerf
I
INTRODUCTION: THE CORNUCOPIA SYNDROME IN THE LAW
The relationship between man and his environment, never entirely
comfortable, has now reached a critical point. Modem technology and
an exploding population enable man to set in motion forces that
threaten the quality of his life, perhaps his survival. There is growing
evidence that our existing social institutions, especially our legal in-
stitutions, are inadequate to come to grips with the problem.
The American concept of environmental law appears to be founded
on a world view as outdated as the Ptolemaic theory of the universe.
Just as Ptolemy saw the earth as the center of the solar system, this
concept envisions man as the center, and perhaps the purpose, of the
universe. Man is viewed as living at the open end of a natural horn of
plenty, with the right, and possibly the obligation, to exploit all natural
resources and to develop and use the bounty of this earth as fully
as he is able.
Complementing this world view is modem man's unshakeable faith
in his ability to conquer nature and control his environment. As Arnold
Toynbee warned, the consequence of such faith may be that technology,
not man, will be the real victor. Toynbee's glum view is borne out
by the growing number of conflicts between technological development
and efforts to keep the environment livable.
Recent public concern with the pollution threat has generated a
rash of suggested solutions. Within the past year councils, agencies, ad-
visory commissions, and billion-dollar programs have been urged upon
us. Reorganizations and reorderings of priorities have been called for.
The question remains, however, whether this welter of proposals
squarely attacks the real problem-the fact that all of our institutions
are rooted in the notions of inexhaustible supply and limitless ability to
repair. The answer can be found only by examining specific conflicts
t United States Representative from New York. B.A. 1950, Cornenl University; LL.B.
1953, Harvard University.
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ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
between technology and environment and analyzing the way our in-
stitutions attempt to resolve them.
II
ENVIRONMENTAL CRisis: THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE
TO DEVELOP A SANE NATIONAL POLICY
The recent near-catastrophe at the mouth of New York Harbor'
is a classic example of the problems caused by our "horn of plenty"
notions and of the inadequacy of existing laws and institutions to
resolve the resulting environmental conflicts. For nearly forty years
municipalities in New Jersey and New York have dumped sewage
sludge in the coastal waters five miles southeast of Ambrose Light.
The area is about twelve miles from the New Jersey beaches to the
west and the same distance from the New York beaches to the north.
Dredge spoil and industrial waste are dumped at a site about five
miles west of the sewage sludge area. Partly as a result of the popula-
tion explosion, the volume of sewage sludge to be disposed of is now
nearly five million cubic yards annually. Accelerated industrialization
and construction in the metropolitan area have raised the amount of
dredge spoil to a staggering six million tons a year. Much of this spoil
is heavily loaded with petro-chemical wastes and contains deadly heavy
metals* such as copper, lead, chromium, and mercury. It is also con-
taminated with hard pesticides, whose environmental impact has only
recently begun to be understood. Adding to the cumulative burden
is the nearly incredible 400 billion gallons of sewage dumped into the
Hudson River each year, which floats slowly out of the mouth of New
York Harbor into the affected area around Ambrose Light.
At some point the total burden of filth became too great for the
natural cleansing power of the ocean. The result is a "Dead Sea," 2
a twenty square-mile area at the mouth of New York Harbor totally
devoid of significant marine life. The area lacks sufficient oxygen to
support fish. Not even sea worms, which tolerate most forms of pollu-
tion, can live there. Samples taken from the bottom show a black,
foul-smelling gook as dead and as hostile to life as the surface of the
moon.
There seems to be no immediate danger to human life from the
"Dead Sea" itself, unless some unfortunate mariner should fall into it.
It has not yet gotten dose enough to the beaches to threaten bathers,
1 Hereinafter sometimes referred to as New York Bight.
2 NmvsWEEK, Feb. 23, 1970, at 86.
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CORNELL LAW RPVIEW
and, since fish and shellfish do not live within its confines, there is
little direct danger of contaminated food, At the periphery, however,
concentrations of bacterial and viral contamination drift unpredictably
into areas where shellfish are harvested. More serious still are the effects
of the heavy metals and the hard pesticides absorbed by drifting micro-
biota around the spoil area. As these organisms are eaten by fish, the
toxic material enters the marine food chain.
It is possible to close down contaminated shellfish harvesting areas
if they are discovered in time, Because fish are vastly more mobile,
however, once the non-biodegradable poisons and other contaminants
have entered the food chain, there is no practical way of controlling
the effect. Fishermen hundreds of miles from the "Dead Sea" area
may already be marketing dangerously contaminated food fish; in fact,
bluefish have been caught far up the Hudson River with advanced
fin rot contracted around the "Dead Sea."
Waste disposal practices capable of creating a lifeless region are,
in themselves, so serious as to warrant immediate action, But a change
has occurred recently that makes the crisis even more severe: the "Dead
Sea" has started to spread rapidly. An environmental chain reaction
has been started. This development carries with it serious new threats
to public health, to economically important Atlantic coastal fisheries,
and to the last remaining public beaches of New York City. Should
the area continue to spread so that it touches both the New York and
the New Jersey beaches, the dead water will form a barrier which will
keep fish from entering and leaving the Hudson, a barrier as effective
as a dam built across the mouth of the river. The valuable anadromous
fish---sturgeon, shad, striped bass-that live in the ocean but can breed
only in the fresh waters of the Hudson will be denied access to their
breeding ground. It will at the same time close off access to marine
shoals, and the equally valuable coastal fish that live wholly in the ocean,
but depend upon the coastal areas for food and sanctuary, will be de-
prived of a key element of their environment.
Instead of questioning the adequacy of existing laws and institu-
tions, it is tempting to search for villains who, but for dereliction of
duty, should have prevented this environmental catastrophe. Among
possible targets of blame are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
Interior Department, the Food and Drug Administration, state and
local governments, and the Congress.
The U.S, Army Corps of Engineers has primary responsibility for
the coastal waters involved, and it is under the authority of the Corps
that the dumping is carried out. But however negligent the Corps may
[Vol. 55:666
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ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
have been in the past, it was that agency, prodded by scientists at the
U.S. Marine Laboratory at Sandy Hook, New Jersey, that commissioned
the study revealing the extent and nature of the disaster. Although the
Corps failed to make immediately public the report that followed the
study, it lacked clear legislative authority to act.
State and local governments do most of the dumping and, at the
same time, are responsible for the protection of public health and the
beaches. But they had no way of knowing that long-accepted practices
of dumping waste in the ocean had suddenly become a threat to the
environment. For example, New York Mayor Lindsay's first intimation
that New York beaches were endangered was the release of the Corps
report in February 1970.3 There is, to date, no effective "early warning
system" for environmental disasters.4
The Food and Drug Administration, exercising its duty to protect
consumers from contaminated foods, urged the dosing of shellfish har-
vesting areas within a six-mile radius of the area. FDA officials hesitated
to take more positive measures, however, since the pollution had spread
beyond the twelve-mile limit and they were unsure of their authority.
Congress, of course, has the primary responsibility to lay down the
policies under which the Corps and other federal agencies operate.
There are at least four federal laws designed to avert the type of
ecological catastrophe that occurred in New York Bight:
(1) The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act5 in effect prevents
the Corps from authorizing projects affecting water development
until it has coordinated its plans with the Department of the
Interior. Its purpose is to assure that all possible steps will be taken
to prevent damage either to fish and wildlife or their natural
habitat.
(2) The Endangered Species Act6 vests very specific responsi-
bilities in the Interior Department and the Army Corps of Engi-
neers to provide for the protection of species of fish and wildlife
in danger of extinction as a result of developmental projectS.
(8) The Estuarine Act7 directs the Interior Department to
survey estuarine areas in coastal regions to determine the impact
of developmental projects and to recommend measures needed to
preserve such areas and the fish and wildlife that inhabit them.
8 The report was released by the author on February 7, 1970. See N.Y. Times, Feb.
8, 1970, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
4 Such a system is currently receiving serious consideration. See NEwswEzx, Feb. 23,
1970, at 87.
5 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-68 (1964).
6 Id. §§ 668aa-ee (Supp. IV, 1969).
7 Id. §§ 1221-26.
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CORNELL LAW REVIEW
(4) Finally, the Hudson River Compact Act s specifically directs
the Corps of Engineers to consult with the Secretary of the Interior
concerning any project that might adversely affect the natural re-
sources of the Hudson River which flows into the New York Bight
area.
Each law, however, is tempered with vague and hedging phrases. Some
direct, for example, that steps to prevent damage should be taken only
"insofar as possible." Others extend agency responsibilities regarding
protection of resources only "insofar as is practical and consistent with
the primary purpose of such bureaus, agencies and services."
On the surface, the Interior Department seems most blameworthy
for the ecological destruction in New York Bight. It is the agency vested
with most of our environmental preservation responsibilities and, in
theory, had clear obligations under the four acts discussed above. In
practice, however, the vagueness of these laws dilute Interior's role to
that of adviser. Furthermore, the Interior Department is by design
a truly schizoid agency. Despite its environmental responsibilities,
however tenuous they may be, the agency is also the biggest developer
and exploiter of natural resources in the United States. Among other
things, it is the largest single producer of electric power, a licenser of
offshore drilling, and a dam builder and developer second only, perhaps,
to the Corps of Engineers. It is not surprising, therefore, that Interior's
concern for environmental protection is overshadowed by its obliga-
tions to the opposition.
It is evident that fault for the disaster of New York Bight lies
not in any agency but in our own failure to set a clear social policy for
environmental protection. In all of the governmental mechanisms that
played a role in the development of the condition of New York Bight,
nowhere is there clear authority for deciding an issue in favor of action
to preserve the environment. We accept such protection only when it
is consistent with development and exploitation. When, as is almost
always the case, it conflicts with development and exploitation or would
impose higher costs upon developers and exploiters, environment has
dearly been a secondary concern. 9 In order to prevent the occurrence
of increasingly more serious environmental disasters, a new statement
8 Act of Sept. 26, 1966, §§ 1-5, 80 Stat. 847.
9 This is highlighted by the Corps of Engineers's defense of its failure to release the
report on the conditions of New York Bight. Corp officials pointed out that the alter-
natives to dumping at the contaminated site would impose what they thought would
be prohibitive costs on the municipalities and industries that were dumping.
[Vol. 55:666
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ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
of national purpose is needed, one that states clearly and forcefully that
restoring and preserving the quality of our environment is one of our
prime national goals.
III
THE INADEqUACY OF STATUTORY SoLunoN: NEED FOR
CONSTrrUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Recent attempts have been made to reorder national priorities.
The National Environmental Policy Act 0 enacted in this last session
of Congress, for example, purported to do just that, but it suffers from
indecisiveness. Although it sets forth a bold statement of environmental
policy, the Act provides little or no mechanism for enforcing that policy.
In the end, there is serious question whether an effective change
in our priorities can ever be achieved by statute alone; what is enacted
by statute can be changed by statute. The controversy surrounding the
Three Sisters Bridge, proposed to be built over the Potomac River in
Washington, D.C., is illustrative. The bridge is warmly supported by
the highway lobby, but it is opposed by virtually every citizens' group
that would be affected, including Washington's main urban planning
body. The opposition protests that the construction would destroy a
beautiful and historic recreation site and would unnecessarily disrupt
settled communities.
In the Department of Transportation Act of 1966,11 Congress en-
deavored to provide a mechanism for resolving the growing number of
conflicts between highway construction and environmental protection.
It created standards and procedures to assure that future highway plan-
ning, design, and construction would be consistent with environmental
preservation. When the highway lobby desired to circumvent those
procedures in the case of the Three Sisters Bridge, however, this was
easily accomplished. Congress merely adopted a provision in a highway
appropriation bill authorizing the construction "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law." 12
In addition to the ease with which statutory protections can be
evaded, there is another danger inherent in continuing to attack the
problem solely through legislation. Widely publicized new legislation
gives the appearance of action without the substance. It lulls the public
into a false confidence that something is being done.
10 42 US.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. March 1970).
11 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-56 (Supp. IV, 1969).
12 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, § 23(a), 82 Stat. 827.
1970]
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CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Probably only an amendment to the Constitution, guaranteeing
to each citizen a wholesome and unimpaired environment, can over-
come these inadequacies.13 Such a provision of the Constitution would
have been meaningless to those attending the Constitutional Convention
in Philadelphia almost 200 years ago. As recently as five years ago it
might have seemed extreme. Today, however, the threats to our en-
vironment and to our survival are as real as were the dangers to free
speech and free assembly to the Constitutional Convention.
Declaring this new right as a matter of constitutional principle is
the kind of national statement of policy that might clarify our present
ambivalence. It would provide badly needed guidance to the federal
agencies and would also provide the most effective environmental
protection within our power. Most important, the process of amending
the Constitution would give the people of the United States the oppor-
tunity to register their affirmation of such a new public policy.
IV
THE IMMEDIATE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN ENVIRONMENTAL
DETERMINATION: THE ELEMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY
If amending the Constitution is the ultimate answer, it is certainly
not the immediate one. The process is neither easy nor quick, since
a drastic change in national priorities requires extensive debate.
Several important actions should be taken in the interim.
First, Congress should coordinate existing environmental respon-
sibilities. If one characteristic stands out in the crisis of New York
Bight, it is the utter confusion of practically everyone involved. Too
many governmental bodies had some responsibility and some authority,
but no one had enough of either. 4 Coordination, therefore, should take
precedence over adding new programs, which may only serve further to
confuse responsibility. It may be politically unfeasible to disturb the
present allocation of power, but Congress should at least vest all existing
advisory authority in a single agency. Similar consolidation at the state
and local levels is advisable.
13 The author was among a group that proposed such an amendment'in 1968. H.R.
Res. 1321, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). [The Editors].
14 At the same time that the experts at the U.S. Marine Laboratory were discovering
the magnitude of the problem, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the
agency charged with cleaning up our waters, was approving construction of four sewage
outfall pipes into the coastal waters. One of these pipes would have the capacity to dump
an additional seven billion gallons of raw sewage into the waters less than two miles from
the contaminated area. Clearly, the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing.
[Vol. 55:666
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ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
Second, an element of accountability must be built into the
bureaucratic structure. If the fishermen and other concerned citizens
who early objected to the dumping in the waters of New York Bight
had been able to make themselves heard, the entire problem might have
been avoided. They were frustrated, however, by the uncertain scope
of each agency's responsibility and the vagueness of agency powers.
These factors combine to make much agency action, or inaction, un-
challengeable. 15
Lack of accountability can be remedied by adding to each federal
program an agency obligation of environmental protection sufficiently
clear to permit judicial review of agency action.16 Even then, however,
the cost of bringing an action will be a serious obstacle to effective
challenge. 7 To overcome this barrier, federal aid should be made
available for any action in which a federal judge holds that an issue
worthy of consideration by the court is presented. Natural resources are
common property, and interested citizens and groups' should not be
forced to assume a substantial financial burden to protect them.
In the final analysis, the best hope for preserving a livable en-
vironment is to entrust its protection to the individual.'8 Growing
interest among our youth and a new willingness to work for legal and
institutional changes are encouraging developments, and they come
not a moment too soon. As the crisis of New York Bight shows,
our resources are finite and in danger of being exhausted. The horn
of plenty is no longer an appropriate symbol of the environment.
15 Unfortunately, the recent trend is away from agency accountability rather than
towards it. The Air Quality Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. IV, 1969)) and the Clean
Waters Restoration Act (80 Stat. 1246 (1966) (codified in scattered sections of 33 US.C.)),
for example, give the federal agencies affected greater discretionary power and make their
actions less accessible to citizen challenge than formerly.
10 See, e.g., § 16(c)(4) of the Proposed Aviation Facilities Expansion Act: "It is
hereby declared to be national policy that airport development projects authorized
pursuant to this [Act] shall provide for the protection and enhancement of the natural
resources and the quality of environment of the Nation." H.R. 14465, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1969).
17 The Storm King Mountain case (Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 54
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966)), for example, is reputed to have
cost citizens' groups nearly half a million dollars, and the issue is still unresolved.
18 For an extended analysis of the reasons underlying this conclusion, see Porter,
Everyone Wants to Save the Environment But No One Knows Quite What to Do, 3
THE CENa MAGAZINE, March 1970, at 35.
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